Formal Specification of Sectrace:
A Protocol to Set up Security Associations and Policies in IPSec Networks

Alwyn Goodloe, Carl A. Gunter, Michael McDougall, Ambarish Sridharanarayanan, and Mark-Oliver Stehr

Keywords: IPSec, Security Associations, Security Policies, Formal Specification

To provide encryption and authentication services IPSec assumes the existence of suitable security associations and policies. Setting up such associations and policies is not a trivial task, especially in the presence of nested channels and concatenated channels involving several security gateways. Since IPSec does not address this problem, the sectrace protocol has be designed in the draft below. In the context of the CONTESSA project we have developped an executable formal specification of the protocol and performed some preliminary analysis. Our analysis indicated that the solutions found by the protocol are not always optimal, because certain possibilities to set up correct security associations are missed. It also shows that that concurrent runs of the protocol can cause undesirable interference effects. As a result ouf this analysis we are currently investigating formal prototypes of alternative protocol designs.

Relevant References:

  1. SECURE TRACEROUTE (SECTRACE), Draft 0, December 2002, Carl A. Gunter, Alwyn Goodloe, and Michael McDougall
  2. SECURE TRACEROUTE (SECTRACE), Draft 1, March 2003, Carl A. Gunter, Alwyn Goodloe, and Michael McDougall

Presentations:

  1. Formal Specification of Sectrace (joint work with A. Sridharanarayanan), Workshop on Context Sensitive Systems Assurance (Contessa'03), April 1, 2003, Philadelphia. Slides available here: ps pdf.

The Formal Specification in Maude 2.0 (available here) can be found here.
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